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Abstract
Deep learning community currently put a very large effort on resistance
to adversarial attacks, and, major improvements has been achieved to
increase local smoothness. In contrast, global smoothness is intrinsically
linked to Lipschitz value, but, the link between these two notions is too
few explored.
In this paper, experiments of object detection and image segmenta-
tion on public remote sensing datasets show that adding Lipschitz related
penalty consistently increase performance under stress (including adver-
sarial attacks).
1 Introduction
Deep learning (see [14] for a review) is currently the state of the art of
many intelligence artificial applications. Yet, deep learning performances
are plagued by adversarial examples (see [7, 17, 23] as samples of adver-
sarial example literature). At test time, it is possible to design a specific
invisible/marginal perturbation such as a targeted network eventually pre-
dicts different outputs on original and disturbed input. This threat is
worsen as producing adversarial examples does not require to have ac-
cess to the internal structure of the network [16] and can have physical
implementation [12].
In addition, an other issue is the lack of global smoothness of deep net-
work, typically linked to Lispchitz constant of the network, and, not just
to local smoothness which is strengthen by adversarial defences. Thus,
quite orthogonally with the very large effort of the community on adver-
sarial defence (e.g. [26, 25, 22]), this paper focus on Lispchitz related
penalty like [3, 1].
Now, most Lispchitz related methods only measures their effects with
accuracy i.e. global smoothness is measured as a way to reduce overfit-
ting. But, there is no trivial link between smoothness (model dependant)
and overfitting (model and data dependant). Instead, this paper offers as
framework to measure Lispchitz penalty effect by accuracy under stress
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(including adversarial attack but not only) i.e. global smoothness is mea-
sured as a way to increase local smoothness (even if adversarial defence
are obviously a more straightforward way to do so for small perturbation).
In contrast, this paper presents remote sensing experiments (object de-
tection and image segmentation on remote sensing datasets) which shows
consistently that the offered Lispchitz related penalty increases perfor-
mance under stress while being related to the global smoothness of the
network (an not just local smoothness).
In this paper, the focus is given to remote sensing applications. On
one hand, remote sensing image can not be hacked like social network im-
ages (by modifying encoding), or, autonomous driving images (by hacking
traffic signs). But, on the other hand, remote sensing system should deal
with large illumination changes, death pixels, atmospheric blur, and, cam-
ouflage which is totally an adversarial attack. Also, many remote sensing
applications like car counting, or, image based smart farming are currently
waiting certification framework to be used in real life while autonomous
driving may require more time. And, such framework will probably in-
clude robustness evaluation.
So, the contributions of this paper are:
• it offers a new Lispchitz related penalty
• which is evaluated as a way to increase performances under stress
i.e. to increase local smoothness and not to reduce overfitting
• using a toolbox (made public) for stress evaluation including both
adversarial attack (typically Fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
[7]), and, common perturbation (a subset of [8])
• the consistent trend of our remote sensing experiments is that this
new penalty term increases performance under stress
The new penalty term is presented in section 3 after related works of
section 2. Experiments are presented in section 4 before conclusion.
2 Related works
2.1 Stress test and adversarial defence
Definition of dependable evaluation is not that clear. Two theoretical dead
end forbids a formal dependable evaluation: without a formal definition
of the task, formal proof of correctness is impossible (typically [10] can
prove some property but it can prove nothing about accuracy on unknown
samples), and, all classifiers are equally bad averaged on all classification
problem [24].
So dependable evaluation should have something to do with very large
testing datasets. But, very large datasets are expensive to collect. Thus,
more realistically, dependable evaluation will be related to middle size
testing datasets augmented to be stress tests (and simulation, plus, formal
property which are out of the scope of this paper).
Typically, [8] offers a toolbox to augment testing data with agnostic
perturbations, and shows that classical network performs poorly on these
augmented data. This toolbox could obviously be combined by adversarial
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attack like FGSM. Now, high performance under stress can be straight-
forwardly achieves by local smoothness typically obtained by considering
state of the art of adversarial defence, but also, by global smoothness
typically related to Lispchitz constant.
Most classical adversarial defence is adversarial training [22] i.e. train-
ing on data plus adversarial data. An emerging way is [25] where network
output is optimized to be absolutely stable around each training point
allowing mathematical guarantee. A soft version of [25] is [26] where the
guarantee on robustness is relaxed to allow a training closer to classi-
cal training with a simpler trade off between robustness, and, (training)
accuracy.
However, none of these methods is designed to increase global smooth-
ness of the network. This global smoothness is more related to Lispchitz
constant.
2.2 Lispchitz methods
A function f from RI in RJ is said K Lipschitz for a norm ||.||I and ||.||J
if ∀x, y ∈ RD, ||f(x) − f(y)||J ≤ K||x − y||I . As continuous, piecewise
infinitely derivable function, relu based deep network areK Lipschitz func-
tion. So, naively, deep network could be expected to be smooth function.
However both K and I can be very large: K is estimated to by higher
than 50000 for first Alexnet layers in L2 norm [23] while I = 227×227×3.
So, modifying each pixel value a an input image just by 1 can lead to a
7729350000 gap from the original likelihood produced by Alexnet on this
image. Thus, to be really smooth, deep network should have a much more
lower Lipschitz coefficient (LC).
Different penalties have been offered in literature to tackle this issue in-
cluding L2 penalty, spectral penalty [3] or gradient penalty [1]. This penal-
ties are usually added to classical binary cross entropy loss. More formally,
let x be input image, y the corresponding ground truth, f the network with
θ the current weights, and, hence, f(x, θ) the probability produced by the
network. Then, the total loss is l(x, y, θ) = BCE(f(x, θ), y) + λR(f, x, θ)
with BCE the binary cross entropy and R the regularity function (e.g.
||θ|| or other). Weights θ of the network are then updated using stochastic
gradient descent approach i.e. following the gradient ∇θl(x, y, θ).
As measuring the global smoothness of the network is not straight-
forward, most evaluations of these methods were focused on accuracy i.e.
these regularisation losses have been used as a way to control overfitting.
In this paper, the evaluation is instead focused on accuracy under stress.
Indeed, as global smoothness should imply a relative local smoothness,
evaluating accuracy under stress seems more relevant than overfitting re-
duction which is not directly related to robustness.
2.3 Applications
Soon after deep learning becomes the state of the art of image classifi-
cation with Alexnet [11], deep learning object detector appear with [6]
and immediately outperforms previous state of the art in object detection
(like [5]).
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Since [6], a large number of deep learning detectors have been designed.
Most salient deep detectors are [20] which improves [6] but using deep
learning box proposal instead of static one, [19] which directly predicts
boxes from a dense feature map, then extended by [15] which offers a
better way to encode boxes score in feature map. Alternatively, detection
can also be extracted from semantic segmentation map when object does
not overlap. This segment before detect paradigm is widely used in remote
sensing [2].
Segmentation is independently an other task where networks outper-
forms previous state of the art since [13]. Typical structure for image
segmentation is UNet [21].
Both these tasks can found tremendous applications in remote sensing
which are usually non critical applications. This way, such remote sensing
applications may be the first real life industrial application of deep learning
(excluding multimedia applications). This is why this paper focus on
remote sensing applications (see datasets).
3 Batch centred Lispchitz regularization
This section describes the offered new Lispchitz regularization and differ-
ence with previous Lispchitz regularizations.
L2 weight penalty is the easiest way to lower LC, but, controlling of
the regularisation is hard as all weights of all layers are considered equally.
Spectral penalty takes advantages of the layered structure of the network.
However, as pointed by [9], product of each layer spectral norm is a very
loose bound of LC. Finally, penalizing gradient norm (according to inputs
not weights i.e. ||∇xf(x)||) has the advantage to estimate the real LC,
but, only locally around each point on with the gradient is computed (and
with the disadvantage of requiring second order derivatives).
Also, penalizing gradient norm is usually done on the loss: training
tries to make the loss more Lispchitz. But this is problematic as loss is
compute after softmax.
Instead in this paper, the objective is to make only the features more
Lispchitz - neither the classifier (e.g. three last layers) neither the loss. So,
network f is decomposed into an encoder g and a classifier h with weights
θ being decomposed into φ, ψ, likelihood on input x is then g(h(x, φ), ψ)
and loss on this sample (associated with y ground truth) is l(x, y, φ, ψ) =
BCE(g(h(x, φ), ψ), y) +λ||∇xh(x, φ)|| where ||∇xh(x, φ)|| design the sum
of ||∇xhi(x, φ)|| for all components i.
In practice, framework (like pytorch or tensorflow) allows to compute
scalar function loss but does not allow to share the graph of derivative
making it intractable to compute the sum over i of individual gradient.
Yet, this paper offers to compute a batch centred Lispchitz regularization:
‖∇x ‖h(x)− href‖‖ is computed with href being the average of h(x) on
the batch.
4
4 Experiments
4.1 Setting
Experiments have been conducted on a public remote sensing datasets of
object detection and segmentation.
To evaluate performance under stress a toolbox similar to [8] has been
developed for detection context. Also, this toolbox contains adversarial
noise (implemented by FGSM).
For detection, following [4], task considered is center object detection.
A distance of 1 meter is set to allow a predicted center to be matched with
a ground truth center. Then, prediction and ground truth are matched
like in classical detection. Performance is summarized by the g score
(product of recall and precision). 3 datasets are used for detection: ISPRS
POTSDAM 1, VEDAI [18], and the GDRSS DFC data fusion contest 2015
[13].
Dataset are resized in order to provide a large range of resolution:
VEDAI is used with little resizing such that a car is contained into a
32x32 box, DFC2015 is resized such that a car is contained into a 48x48
box, and, finally, POTSDAM is slightly resized such that a car is contained
into a 64x64 box. Obviously, performance are expected to increase with
the resolution (this will be the case).
For segmentation, performance is measured by the straightforward
overall accuracy on the same datasets except VEDAI where no labelling
is available.
Detector are based on SSD [15] but adapted to center regression. Core
of the detector are both VGG and Resnet like in [15]. For segmentation,
UNet is straightforwardly considered.
4.2 Results
All regularisation losses are evaluated with the same pipeline. However,
on these datasets, L2 weight penalty has no impact on the performance
except for large λ for which it makes all weights collapsing to 0 (leading
to a very poor result) Spectral regularity exhibits a very strong numeri-
cal instability. Also, standard gradient penalty [1] tends to degrade the
performances (with and without stress). The fact that these methods to
have such negative impact is quite surprising. For [1] which is very close
to our method, it may be due to the softmax (it penalizes after softmax
and here it is penalize before independently from the label). Either, these
methods are not adapted to this remote sensing context, or, this paper
may have too naively implement these (despite λ which balances BCE
loss and regularity loss is optimized on a grid). So, no conclusion will be
stated for them.
Now, an interesting result is comparison of performance with and with-
out our regularity. Indeed, the main result of this paper is that the of-
fered gradient regularisation mitigated the drop of performances caused
by stress consistently across all datasets, tasks and networks. Raw per-
formance are given as reference to measure this drop (see tabular 1).
1www2.isprs.org/commissions/comm3/wg4/2d-sem-label-potsdam.html
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VEDAI 32x32 DFC 48x48 POTSDAM 64x64
VGG 53 66 78
VGG reg 53 66 81
RESNET 39 60 80
RESNET reg 43 49 82
UNET - 84 86
UNET reg - 79 82
Table 1: Performances on raw data (without noise).
On raw data, performance are quite similar with or without regularisation (a
little less when adding regularisation), and, consistent with the literature.
Performances are measured in g-score in detection for SSD (based on VGG
and RESNET) - accuracy in segmentation for UNET.
VEDAI 32x32 DFC 48x48 POTSDAM 64x64
VGG 30 51 66
VGG reg 36 57 74
RESNET 22 24 50
RESNET reg 17 29 69
UNET - 60 38
UNET reg - 68 42
Table 2: Performances after 2 steps of FGSM.
Adding regularization greatly moderate the performance drop caused by two
step of FGSM attack compared to raw training.
Performances are measured in g-score in detection for SSD (based on VGG and
RESNET) - accuracy in segmentation for UNET (no available for VEDAI).
Most striking results is in table 2: native model are very sensitive to
FGSM, and, performance under two FGSM steps are very low compared
to performances on raw data. Yet, adding the offered regularization mod-
erate this drop. Regularized algorithms eventually outperform their raw
version by average 5% (g-score for detection, accuracy for segmentation).
Off course, adversarial training may be even more efficient, but, here the
regularisation is linked to global smoothness of the network, not just local.
An other striking results is in table 3: image are noised by a strong
Gaussian noise (variance is 512). Again, performances drop, but, this
drop is mitigated by regularisation. Let stress that, as, performance is
measured in g-score in detection, it can even increase with noise by in-
creasing precision and/or ratio between precision and recall. Typically, on
VEDAI, performances often increase with agnostic noise (never observed
for adversarial noise). This phenomenons is not seen in segmentation as
accuracy is much more smooth metric. On this last experiment, it is
not clear at all to known if common adversarial training and/or certified
defense based polytop would have been effective in front of such large
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VEDAI 32x32 DFC 48x48 POTSDAM 64x64
VGG 54 29 52
VGG reg 52 54 56
RESNET 38 17 56
RESNET reg 45 45 76
UNET - 58 39
UNET reg - 65 44
Table 3: Performances after adding a 512 variance Gaussian noise.
Adding regularization greatly moderate the performance drop caused by a 512
variance Gaussian noise compared to raw training.
Performances are measured in g-score in detection for SSD (based on VGG and
RESNET) - accuracy in segmentation for UNET (no available for VEDAI).
VEDAI DFC2015 POTSDAM
Figure 1: Performances vs steps of FGSM.
x axis is number of steps of FGSM. y axis is gscore.
amplitude Gaussian noise while global smoothness offers some protection.
More detailed results are quantified in following figures (all raw re-
sults including variance estimation on several training are available on
the github) which print performance for detection algorithms on the 3
datasets for Gaussian, black-white and adversarial noise (see figures 1, 2,
3). x axis is the level of noise: step of FGSM, percentage of dead pixel or
Gaussian variance level (variance is proportionnal to square of level). y
axis is the performance.
VEDAI DFC2015 POTSDAM
Figure 2: Performances vs percentage of dead pixels.
x axis is percentage of dead pixel. y axis is gscore.
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VEDAI DFC2015 POTSDAM
Figure 3: Performances vs level of Gaussian noise.
x axis is level of Gaussian noise. y axis is gscore.
5 Conclusion
This article focuses on object detection performance under stress, and,
benchmark different kind of regularization theoretically expected to make
the detector more Lipschitz.
On three public remote sensing datasets, performances under stress on
detection/segmentation are increased by using batch based gradient norm
penalty. Such kind of regularisation are a way to advance on safety issue
raise by deep learning detector.
However, as perspective, our result is far from closing this issue. First,
such experiment should be reproduced in more large datasets, and, mainly,
performance under stress still heavily decreases with stress level (even if
this drop is much slower with regularisation than without). An other se-
rious point is that, in our experiment, the more an algorithm is efficient
on raw data, the more it tend to be sensitive to noise (typically perfor-
mance without noise are higher on POTSDAM than on VEDAI, but, the
drop of performance with noise is higher too on POTSDAM compared to
VEDAI).
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